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Introduction
Low-quality infrastructure is increasingly recognized as a barrier for development. Even as developing countries are reaching close to universal access to electricity services, offering reliable and affordable supply has remained a challenge (Briceno et al. 2004; Fay and Morrison 2007 ). This situation is particularly latent among the poorest income groups, who usually tend to connect informally at the cost of facing the worst quality of service (Mimmi and Ecer 2010) . As a consequence, such groups experience large welfare costs. For example, Chakravorty et al. (2014) estimate that a 32 percent increase in hours of service per day rises nonagricultural incomes by 38.6 percent. In addition to being associated with illegal connections, low-quality infrastructure is nonetheless highly subsidized, representing a severe financial problem for utilities (see McRae (2015) for the case of Colombia). Jimenez et al. (2014) estimate that electricity losses, mainly due to electricity theft, are around 0.3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Latin America region.
If low-quality electricity services translate into losses for utilities and users, why does this situation persist? One potential explanation is that most illegal users are too poor to connect. As an interrelated factor, tolerance toward electricity theft may be exploited in search of political gains (Golden and Min 2012) . It may be the case that users prefer free or cheap electricity services, regardless of the associated welfare losses. The trade-off between cost of services and preferences of users, taking into account their income level, represents a behavioral and policy relevant question: do households conform to low-quality services or are they willing to pay for improvements?
To address this question, I designed a choice experiment in urban Dominican Republic that randomly varied alternative electricity services with different levels of attributes. The attributes included the number, length, and timing of outages; voltage stability; cost of service; punctuality in delivering bills; and response time to claims. All the choice situations included a status quo option that allowed the users to stay in their current situation. The alternatives were intended to present the users with multiple trade-offs between attributes, including scenarios of service improvements at higher costs. The design also took into account the differences in types of services received by formal and informal clients. The model allows for heterogeneity in users' preferences, and examination of the role of income in attitudes toward the attributes of electricity services. Through the generated experimental data, I estimate the willingness to pay (WTP) for service improvements, and study its variation across households.
State preference methods represent a suitable approach for studying individual choices for infrastructure services. These types of services provide conditions under which respondents can be expected to provide honest answers. On this point, Carson et al. (Carson and Groves 2007; Carson et al. 2006 ) point out that choices related to infrastructure services can be more readily incentive compatible than those for private goods, because in the first case the payment is usually mandatory. That is, respondents are expected to be more careful in their choices, because they later would have to face one of such scenarios, reducing potential strategic behavior in the choice situations. Further, the stated preferences approach is useful for considering all the welfare effects, by including nonmarket effects. By contrast, revealed preference methods are difficult to apply, due to the nature of these services. Electricity services are natural monopolies, where end-users have few options in the type of service received and take-up is compulsory. At the same time, these services are regulated, such that significant variability in the quality of service should not be expected.
Even if sufficient variability is observed, it may be strongly endogenous, meaning that the allocation of better services would go to areas with differentiated characteristics.
The case study constitutes an ideal and timely context to valuate consumer preferences for different characteristics of the electricity services. Urban Dominican Republic has one of the highest rates of electricity loss in the world, mainly because of informal connections, and one of the lowest levels of quality and reliability. Together with highly subsidized electricity tariffs, this situation translates into financial losses for the utilities that represents annual fiscal subsidies that represent between 0.6 and 0.8 percent of the GDP. Although over the last several years, the utilities have made efforts to reduce these problems, progress has been slow such that only 50% of household receive uninterrupted services. At the same time, the country presents significant variability in the quality of electricity services across its territory. In turn, such variability and the efforts are widely known among users, contributing to enhancing the credibility of the choice situations by the respondents.
The main results of this study suggest that, regardless of their economic situation, users facing service deficiencies are willing to pay for improvements. In the sample of 2,479 users, only 10 percent chose to stay in the status quo. Those users were mostly formal clients, and 50 percent of them already had good quality service. The estimated average willingness to pay among informal users is US$9, while for formal users it is around 22 percent of their current monthly bill (US$5 on average). However, the estimated valuations vary widely across individuals. Factors explaining this variance include family size, dwelling size, users' satisfaction, and income. Household income plays a substantial role in shaping users' preferences and their capacity to pay. The study found that the elasticity of WTP with respect to income is around 0.1. In addition, this paper shows that accounting for individual heterogeneity in the modeling, is not only more realistic, but also improves the performance of the estimations, allowing to elicit more reliable results. A relevant variable that appears to capture such heterogeneity is the household income. Overall, the results are robust to various specifications, estimation methods, and assumptions about the individuals' heterogeneity.
This study joins a growing literature on the valuation of electricity attributes based on stated preferences methods (Blass et al. 2010; Hensher et al. 2014; Carlsson et al. 2011; Abdullah and Mariel 2010; Morrison and Nalder 2009; Carlsson and Martinson 2007, 2008 ; Yu et al. 2009 ). This literature has considered fewer attributes, and it has mainly been concentrated on developed countries. Therefore, the findings on the preferences of endusers, and estimates of their WTP for improved services, are hardly comparable or valid for the context under analysis. To my knowledge, Abdullah and Mariel (2010) is the only application to a developing country, Kenya; however, also in this case, end-users were already clients of the utility. Regarding the attributes used in previous articles, it is important to differentiate between experiments aimed at investigating valuations in households and firms. In the former case, the attributes used are mainly related to reliability, including price, number of blackouts, and their average duration. These findings suggest so far that households seem not to perceive the quality characteristics of the provided services.
In contrast, in the case of firms, quality dimensions, such as brownouts, surges, and customer service (e.g., notice of service failure, time in telephone queue) are also relevant (Morrison and Nalder 2009 ).
Unlike previous stated preferences experiments, I am able to model and quantify the role of income in users' preferences and valuations. This paper also contributes to the literature by distinguishing between formal and informal users, with ad hoc experimental designs that allow for examining their disposition to become clients, and studying the determinant of the heterogeneity in preferences. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper to do so, representing a timely and relevant application for public policy aimed at increasing improved formal access to utility services.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents background on the case study. Section 3 describes the modeling of the individual choices, estimation method, and experimental design. Section 4 describes the sample and the data. Section 5 discusses the results, focusing on the heterogeneity in individual valuations, and the attribute profiles of their preferred services. Section 6 concludes.
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Background of the Case Study
Electricity distribution services in the Dominican Republic are mainly provided by stateowned utilities, in a difficult business environment characterized by poor physical infrastructure, substantial electricity theft, and low payment rates. This situation translates into one of the lowest levels of quality of electricity services in the world. During 2015, formal users experienced 35 interruptions per month of an average length of 3.3 hours. 1 Electricity users can be broadly divided into formal and informal. Formal users are classified by the utilities according to the hours of electricity available per day. Of a total of around two million of clients, 900,000 have service 24 hours a day; 63,000, 21 hours; 300,000, 18 hours; and around 640,000, around 16 hours. In addition, the utilities estimate that around 400,000 households are informal users, which usually face the lowest quality of services (CDEEE 2014) . This group has no metering or contracts, implying that they do not pay for the electricity consumed. This consumption is registered as electricity losses by the utilities.
The current composition of electricity users has a long history, which is important for understanding individual perceptions toward services. Since the mid-1900s, the expansion of new connections to the growing urban population has been undertaken mainly under political mandate, largely intended to gain public opinion support, and with severe investment capacity constraints. This gave place to low-quality electricity provided at low cost or free of charge. Many households connected over these many decades were usually not registered as regulated clients. Thus, the origin of today's main sources of electricity losses can arguably be classified as theft, since households were connected by the utility. In this situation, the type of electricity services received by clients is, to a great extent, exogenous. 2 Electricity tariffs in the country are heavily subsidized. On average, as of 2015, the electricity tariffs are around 20 percent below cost recovery levels, meaning that even formal clients do not pay the full cost of the electricity supplied. Further, tariffs are defined by consumption blocks, where the lowest block, between zero and 200 kilowatt-hours (kWh)/month, is charged a variable cost per kWh of around US$0.1. This block gathers 80 percent of residential consumption, meaning that most of the population receives indirect tariff subsidies. In addition, to reduce the vulnerability of poorer households, since 2009, the government has implemented an electricity cash transfer program to households identified as below the national poverty line. This subsidy reaches up to US$10 for monthly electricity expenses, which, at the previous tariff, is equivalent to around 90 kWh of consumption per month. Regardless of the subsidized tariffs, expenditures on electricity services constitute a high proportion of income among clients who report positive electricity expenditures, potentially implying affordability problems. Electricity expenditure represents 12 and 4 percent of total household income for the first and fifth quintiles, respectively. 3
The electricity distribution sector exhibits severe financial deficiencies. In 2015, the cost recovery index was around 66 percent, with electricity losses of around 31 percent. This situation translates into significant operational costs for the utilities, requiring yearly fiscal transfers, which in 2015 were US$417 million, or 0.61 percent of GDP. 4
Methodology
This section discusses the modeling of individual choices, the estimation method, and the design implemented to generate the experimental data.
Conceptual Background
The random utility model provides an appealing framework to disentangle consumers' preferences, so their choices and valuations can be studied in a way that is compatible with standard consumer demand theory. Under this approach, the utility that an individual obtains from alternative , in each choice situation , can be expressed in terms of an observable and a non-observable stochastic component. Assuming linearity and independence between the two components:
where X represents the vector of attributes of the relevant alternatives ( ) for consumer decision making. In this application, X may include the number of outages and cost of electricity services, among others. I further assume that the observable component is linear in those attributes such that where , represents the preference weight of a change in a given attribute. For the cost of services, the corresponding parameter ( , ) represents the monetary value of a unit of utility. Everything else constant, it is expected that a reduction in power outages or a reduction in costs of electricity services will increase the utility of consumers, therefore increasing the probability that they choose the alternative offering such advantages.
However, a reduction in power outages can come at an increase in cost, a trade-off that needs to be evaluated by the consumer in deciding whether to leave or stay in the status quo.
This presentation allows the parameters to vary by individual. The parameters represent the preference weight that each individual attaches to each attribute, and attribute levels.
These values are relevant for studying the heterogeneity among consumers and the potential implications of the adoption of alternatives with different characteristics, as well as for examining differences in valuations across segments of the population.
In addition to idiosyncratic elements, heterogeneity in the preference weights may be explained by differences in individuals' observable characteristics, such as income, education, gender, and so forth. Following Greene (2012), the mean of the random parameters-those allowed to vary in the population-can be specified as a function of the variables of interest. This approach provides great flexibility, as preferences can be directly modeled as a function of some observable variables, while maintaining a stochastic component. A particularly relevant variable in the context of public utilities in developing countries is income, as it is directly related to users' capacity to afford service improvements.
Therefore, I allow the mean of the random parameter to depend on household per capita income and its square. Assuming an additive linear structure, it can be expressed as 5
where the individual preference weight depends on a common fixed term for each attribute ( ), and its income ( ) and income squared ( 2 ). The population mean of each parameter is composed by
is the individual-specific heterogeneity, and is the standard deviation of the parameter around the population mean. Therefore, in this model, heterogeneity is allowed to arise from individual income differences and an unobservable component for which the distribution among individuals is assumed. 
As previously, the direction and magnitude of the change require empirical evaluation, and may depend on the position of the individual in the income distribution.
The proposed framework is relatively general; however, it is interesting to compare its performance and estimations against more restricted ones. A more restricted framework would be a model in which the parameters are assumed to be fixed among users (i.e., by dropping the suffix from equation 2); I call this model 1. The parameters can also be 9 allowed to vary following a random distribution but not depending on individual characteristics. In model 2, I keep the price parameter fixed, while allowing the other parameters to be random. In model 3, I also allow the price parameter to vary. 7 In model 4, the random parameters are allowed to depend only on the first-degree income. Model 5 exploits all the flexibility described in equations 2 and 3.
Characterizing the status quo. The utility of the status quo is not assumed to be zero.
This assumption is suitable in some cases and debatable in others. In applications where the good does not exist or it is known that the individual does not have it, it is reasonable to assume the status quo utility is constant or zero. However, if the individual already has the good, assuming a fixed base utility would imply that attributes are at a fixed level for all individuals. If this is not the case, such assumption resembles a problem of non-observable service characteristics in the "current situation," potentially leading to estimation bias. In this application, users already have electricity services of different characteristics, obtaining differentiated utilities; therefore, the effects that the alternatives have on individuals'
decisions depend on the relative levels of the attributes (compared with the current situation). The data set that was collected allows including the characteristics of the status quo, and evaluating the performance of the estimations accounting for such attributes against the usual practice of normalizing it to zero.
As an aside. Obtaining negative WTP estimates is recurrent in the literature, representing a controversial issue. In many applications, negative estimates are theoretically unexpected and difficult to explain (e.g., Cameron and Quiggin 1994, 1998; Lockwood et al. 1996) . For example, in this application, WTP for fewer interruptions is expected to be positive, meaning that a greater number of interruptions and higher prices cause disutility.
Negative WTP would imply that the change in one of these attributes actually causes positive utility, challenging most working hypotheses based on rational behavior. been common, suggesting that people may be signaling through their choices that they do not want/believe in those instruments. In this application, negative WTP estimates may reflect that some users are willing to face lower quality of services to reduce the monthly cost they pay, or that they are accustomed to their current situation. That is, the disutility of the price effect dominates the utility from a service improvement (i.e., some individuals are not disposed to face the trade-off between the increased cost of the services and the improved quality).
Estimation Method
As utilities are not observed, individual 's decision about an alternative in a choice situation is modeled as a discrete choice:
where is defined by equation 2. In the main empirical specification, it is assumed that the unobserved stochastic component is independently and identically distributed type I extreme value across choice situations, individuals, and alternatives. This distributional assumption implies that * = − follows the logistic distribution (for all ≠ ). With this assumption, the conceptual framework matches the random parameter logit (RPL) model with heterogeneity in the means of the random parameters (McFadden and Train 2000; Train 2009 ). The parameters are allowed to vary per individual, but are constant across choice situations. Conditional on observing , the probability that respondent n chooses alternative j in experiment s is given by the standard logit:
As equation 7 implies ( − > 0), the variability used for estimation comes from variation in the levels of the attributes within the alternatives. Any individual-specific characteristic that does not vary between alternatives (e.g., age, income) is partialed out when taking differences between utilities/choices. The probability that a respondent has made a certain sequence { | = 1} of choices is represented by:
Assuming independence between respondents, the log-likelihood can be expressed as:
As is not observed, the unconditional choice probability is the integral over all its possible values of the parameters:
This expression, the mixed logit probability, can be viewed as a weighted average of the logit formula evaluated over the distribution of given by the mixing distribution ( ). Since equation 10 does not have a closed form, the parameters are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood.
Selecting distributions for the random parameters. For the case of RPL, without
heterogeneity in the mean of the parameter, ( ) reflects that the parameters are distributed as random variables without a deterministic component. The assumption on the preferred distribution for each random coefficient can be derived from theory. For instance, the coefficients for cost or outages (defined from lower to higher number of interruptions) are expected to be negative for all end-users, if nobody prefers higher cost of services and higher number of interruptions. In this context, using unrestricted distributions allows coefficients to take implausible signs (i.e., a positive sign for the price parameter). Also, distributions with infinite range, such as normal or lognormal, allow for extreme implausible parameter values, generating much less precise estimations. Further, from the computational viewpoint, distributions with thick tails are more demanding.
The restricted triangular distribution allows to fix the end-points of the distribution to zero and 2 , such that there is no free variation, and the variance takes the value of the scaling parameter (of the mean). However, this distribution provides empirical freedom, because the parameters can be positive or negative, while the variation is determined by the mean estimation of scaling (Greene, 2016) . Further, assuming distributions that restrict the parameter space, such as this, helps particularly in small-sample applications. Therefore, I
assume that the coefficients follow a restricted triangular distribution.
Comparing performances with different assumptions. Alternative estimation models match different assumptions laid out in the conceptual framework. Model 1 corresponds to the multinomial logit model, while the RPL (without mean heterogeneity) with different specifications for random variables corresponds to model 2 (price parameter is fixed) and model 3 (price parameter is also random). The RPL with heterogeneity in the means, with a different specification for the deterministic component of the mean parameter, corresponds to models 4 and 5.
Experimental Design
Identification of attributes and levels. A key stage in implementing choice experiment (CE) is the correct identification of attributes and levels that are meaningful for end-users. Only if those attributes and the ranges of their corresponding levels are correctly defined will the scenarios will be realistic to the respondents. To identify the attributes and their levels, I
carried out exhaustive fieldwork, which involved 60 in-depth interviews accompanied by closed questionnaires, and complemented with field visits and interviews with experts.
Details of this work are presented in Jimenez et al. (2016) . I identified the following seven attributes: number of interruptions per month, monthly cost of service, lengths of outages, voltage stability, billing punctuality, timing of outages, and response to claims. Table 1 summarizes these attributes and their levels per type of end-user. These attributes correspond to in equation 2. Prices for informal end-users are expressed as amounts, while for formal end-users prices are expressed as an additional percentage of the current average electricity bill.
Choice sets. Having identified the attributes and defined their levels, I proceeded to construct the choice sets, that is, to produce a combination of attributes and attribute levels that would be presented to the respondents. There are several options that can be broadly divided into full-factorial, orthogonal, efficient, and Bayesian designs (see Rose et al. 2009 ).
The full-factorial design provides the entire space of possible combinations of the attributes and their levels; however, such design may return an unmanageably large number for empirical applications. In this application, the full-factorial design returns 21,168 possible combinations for informal and 15,120 for formal users. Orthogonal designs are broadly used in empirical applications; however, it is argued that such designs can produce several choice situations with dominant alternatives, which do not add information to the experiment, other than testing rationality. Efficient designs would outperform orthogonal designs, generating choice tasks to maximize the amount of information about the parameters of the relevant attributes. A key input for this type of design is the priors on the estimated parameters, with the drawback that incorrect priors could lead to greater inefficiencies.
Bayesian efficient designs allow specifying the parameters as random variables, providing greater flexibility and reducing the risk of inefficiency (Bliemer and Rose 2010) .
Therefore, I produced a Bayesian efficient design. As this approach requires priors on the parameters of the distribution to be used, I followed the next steps to find the most suitable priors. (i) I generated 120 alternatives using a Bayesian efficient design with priors from the literature, using a multinomial model (MNL). I used the same "baseline" priors for formal and informal users. During the pilot of the questionnaires, the alternatives, in blocks of three (plus a status quo), were applied to 30 respondents.
(ii) With these data, the new parameters were estimated using an MNL model, separately for formal and informal users.
The final priors were chosen from these estimates, and from previous estimation in the literature, assuming an MNL and a normal distribution for frequency of blackouts, cost, and length of blackouts. 8 Annex 1 presents the priors. The choice sets were computed using N-
It is important to mention that the service characteristics experienced by the respondents were not known with certainty a priori, so the choice sets were not designed with such information. Information on the characteristics of the services was collected during the survey. For estimation, 0 contains the following services characteristics:
outages, cost, voltage, and length of interruptions.
The design took into account the estimation of main effects, and two-way interaction effects between the number of blackouts and length. For each type of user, I generated a total of 200 choice alternatives, clustered into 50 groups of three choice sets. 9 That is, each respondent would face three choice situations, each one containing four alternatives, one of which is the status quo. 10 As ex ante the characteristics of the electricity services received by the household, and the type of user (formal/informal), are not known, the status quo was labeled "as currently" and each "choice set" was pre-allocated sequentially to each questionnaire's number to avoid discretional applications by the surveyors. The alternatives were unlabeled, as they were preferred when the focus was to elicit WTP for specific attributes and avoiding order bias between alternatives (Hensher, Rose, and Greene 2005) .
However, order bias can also appear if respondents only pay attention to the first attributes appearing in the list within each alternative. To avoid this potential problem, I randomly sorted the attributes within each choice situation.
8 Using a simple model (MNL in this case) is a recommended practice, as RPL may take a significant amount of time. 9 To have enough degrees of freedom to estimate such specification, only 80 choice alternatives (choice alternatives or treatment combinations) would be required for informal users and 82 choice alternatives for formal clients. 10 The number of alternatives by choice set and the number of choice sets by respondent were selected to avoid tiredness of respondents. Different combinations were tried during the pilot interviews, including three, four, and five alternatives per choice set (all including the status quo), and three and four choice sets per respondent. Surprisingly, the respondents showed great interest in participating in the experiments.
14 The CE literature highlights that the presence of the status quo option may limit rationality, producing a tendency of respondents to stay in status quo (Hartman et al. 1991 ).
In addition, from the experimental viewpoint, a status quo option may imply the presence of other unobserved factors, not included in attributes, which may lead to over-selection of the current situation. I expect that adding characteristic of the current services reduce the potential presence of such bias. Further, I followed the procedure by Scarpa et al. (2005) , under which alternative specific constants (ASC) are added to capture potential unobservable influences. If this indicator is significant, it would suggest the presence of status quo bias.
Sampling Frame and Data
The surveys were implemented during November 2015 and early March 2016, obtaining a sample of approximately 2,500 households. The interviews were distributed in seven cities of the Dominican Republican, which concentrate around 67 percent of total urban households. Annex 2 shows the distribution of the sample by city. Since there was no previous list of households to survey, the distribution of the sample was randomly selected based on the official Territorial Administrative Division (2012). In the first stage, I randomly selected "sub-districts," which are geographical units composed of between 150 and 1,000
households. Within each sub-district, I randomly selected "areas" composed of around 40-100 households. Depending on the size of the sub-district, between four and 15 households were randomly selected for interviewing. 11
The interview consisted of the application of a closed questionnaire and the CE. Based on the characteristics of the household's electricity service, the interviewer applied the corresponding CE for formal or informal clients. The rule to apply a CE designed for informal clients was: if the end-users do not have a contract or if they do not pay for the services.
Otherwise, the interviewer applied the choice sets designed for formal clients. The rate of respondents accepting the interview was 77 percent. Of those accepting the interview, 4 percent stopped the interview at some point. 12 All interview rejections were replaced to reach a target sample size of 2,500.
The summary statistics for the final sample are presented in Table 2 , which shows that 11 The number of households to be interviewed per area was selected to reach a power of 80 percent in case of implementing a follow-up survey. The selection of each household followed a standard field procedure: count 10 households from each strong point. A strong point is any place that is distinctive in a given neighborhood and may be used as a reference point for location purposes (e.g., a police station, a church). 12 Following a random selection process, a total of 3,427 doors were knocked, of which 610 households rejected the interview, and 217 did not answer.
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formal and informal users are markedly different. On average, households with informal electricity connections tend to have lower incomes and face poorer quality electricity supply.
Consistently, their satisfaction with the services is lower. Both groups are also different in ownership of appliances and characteristics of the dwelling, such as type of dwelling and number of rooms. Differences between family characteristics, such as gender and schooling of the household head, and family size, are not statistically different. Neither is the difference in the cognitive indexes between the two groups. 13 Tables 3 and 4 Column 3 allows individuals to have different tastes for cost of services. In column 4, it is further assumed that the means of the random parameters depend on income. Column 5, which is the preferred specification, also includes income squared, to test nonlinearity of the preferences of the end-users.
Results
Estimated Preference Weights
Throughout the estimations, the mean parameters have the expected signs; however, their statistical significance presents some differences between types of end-users. On the one hand, number of interruptions, average monthly payment, voltage stability, and length of blackouts always have a significant effect on individuals' decisions. On the other hand, response time to claims has an effect only on informal users, while billing punctuality and timing seem to be relevant only for formal users. In the case of timing of blackouts, this specification only indicates that they are relevant for individual decisions. To appreciate the time of day during which blackouts are preferred to occur if they have to, this attribute needs to be entered as a factor variable. The results are shown in Figure 1 , for the MNL model, suggesting that the less preferred time of occurrence of interruptions is at night for formal users, while nonsignificant preferences are detected for informal users.
The heterogeneity in preferences is strongly statistically significant, as measured by the standard deviation of the random parameters. As heterogeneity is gradually allowed, the chances of reproducing the actual sequence of individual choices continually improves (i.e., the fit of the model improves; see the log likelihood, R-squared, and Akaike information criterion at the bottom of Tables 3 and 4) . For example, the inclusion of the price parameter as random in model 3 shows that respondents indeed have very heterogeneous attitudes toward service cost, and increases the likelihood of the model, particularly for informal users. Recall, that in using a restricted triangular distribution, the estimated standard deviations for the random parameters are equal to the scaling parameters. Annex 3 presents the same regressions assuming an unrestricted normal distribution for all parameters. The parameters for the mean and nonrandom components, and the standard deviation, are similar in sign and statistical significance. However, in these specifications, income is not systematically significant.
For the heterogeneity in the mean, the results in columns 3 and 4 indicate that income plays an important role in explaining heterogeneity in individual preferences and shaping their attitudes toward electricity services. In these models, the population mean of the parameters can be computed directly following equation 3. For example, from model 5, at the average income for informal users, the interruptions parameter is -0.05, while the price parameter is -0.06. For formal users, the corresponding estimates are -0.17 and -7.66, respectively. The positive sign of the first-degree income parameter suggests that for wealthier households, "aversion" to interruptions, service cost, voltage instability, and length of interruptions decreases. That is, the first-degree income effect seems to offset the negative impact of higher number of outages, probably due to greater capacity to cope with them. However, the coefficient for squared income tends to have negative signs, indicating that the overall income effect is bounded, as theoretically expected. 14 Table 5 presents the average elicited WTP per attribute based on the coefficients previously estimated. I report only the sum of WTP for outages, voltage, and length of interruptions, as the significances of those attributes are consistent across all models. For informal users, the average monthly WTP ranges between US$11.8 (model 2) and around US$8.7 (model 5). In the case of formal users, expressed as a share of their current electricity bill, it ranges from an additional 43 percent (model 2) to 22 percent (model 5). Noticeably, in both cases, the bulk of WTP is explained by the high valuation of voltage. Overall, as greater heterogeneity is allowed, estimated WTP tends to decrease, particularly when income is accounted for, suggesting the relevance of including this variable.
Heterogeneity in Estimates of Willingness to Pay
This subsection takes advantage of models 3 to 5, which generate the full distribution of WTP across individuals. As before, WTP is the sum of valuations for outages, voltage, and length of outages, and expressed in monthly U.S. dollars. 15 Figure 2 presents the unconditional distribution of the WTP estimates for the different models implemented here. As can be observed, the distributions differ between models and, consistent with the previous calculations, the modalities of the distributions tend to shift to the left as the estimations account for greater heterogeneity and income is included. The modalities are closer to zero in the case of formal clients, which is expected, as in this case it represents an additional amount to pay. Models 2 and 3 restrict the range of the estimated parameters; therefore, WTP only takes positive values. In the cases of models 4 and 5, where the mean depends on household per capita income, around 10 percent of the respondents have negative WTP (informal and formal).
Negative WTP. As discussed in the methodology section, the meaning of negative WTP is a matter of empirical and theoretical debate. Here, negative estimates are interpreted as reflecting not having a disposition for leaving the status quo, because of the following reasons. First, around 90 percent of the respondents with negative WTP are already formal clients, and 50 percent of all negatives already have the best quality of service. Second, the proportion of respondents with negative WTP decreases as they face better quality of services, suggesting that the alternative scenarios were not attractive enough, given a price increase.
To explore further the nature of the negative estimates of WTP, I compare the previous results with those obtained from ignoring the characteristics of users' current services, therefore normalizing the corresponding utility to zero (see Annex 4). In this case, the share of respondents with negative WTP is slightly higher, around 13 percent of the sample. Annex 5 presents the differences in distribution of the estimated WTP between the two specifications, showing that valuations are greater once the actual characteristics of the status quo are observed. The main message is that in the presence of high variability, such as in this application, choice experiments should account for the attributes of the status quo.
That is, it is not that respondents choosing to stay in the status quo do not want an improvement, but that they already receive a relatively good quality of service.
To investigate if irrationality plays a role in explaining the negative estimates, I generate a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the estimated WTP is negative, and regress it against a cognitive index. The results are presented in Annex 6, where no systematic correlation between the variables is detected. 16 Status quo bias. Annex 7 presents the regression of model 5, adding ASC for each alternative. In these regressions, I dropped alternative 3 to avoid perfect multicollinearity.
The results show that only the ASC for status quo is significant; however, the sign is negative for formal and informal clients. That is, contrary to the expected direction of the bias overselection of the status quo, the results indicate that respondents tend to reject the typical low quality of services provided. This effect is stronger for informal users, which may also be interpreted as the absence of some "cultural factors" by which Dominicans would prefer not paying and keeping low-quality services.
WTP per income quartile.
To simplify the presentation, in the following, the analysis concentrates on the results of the more general model 5. 
Determinants of WTP across Individuals
It has been shown that there are meaningful differences in the distribution of WTP between formal and informal users, and by income groups within each type. In this subsection, I
examine the extent to which the variance in users' valuations can be explained by a rich set of household characteristics. Table 7 With respect to users' perceptions, higher service satisfaction seems to be positively associated with WTP. Further, when the interaction with being an informal user is added, the main effect persists, indicating that users tend to reward good quality services. However, the interaction is negative, although weakly statistically significant, logically suggesting that informal users who are satisfied with the service have no incentive to leave their current situation. 21 The progressive inclusion of control variables changes the magnitude of the estimated coefficients only marginally. These results are robust to including ownership of appliances, characteristics of the service, characteristics of the household, and characteristics of the 19 These regressions do not include the amount of electricity expenditure, because the dependent variable is calculated with this variable. 20 Given the income distribution, it is expressed in U.S. cents per household member. 21 As shown in a related paper (Jimenez 2017) , satisfaction with electricity service is strongly related to the attributes of electricity services.
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dwelling. Among these variables, owning a fan, family size, and dwelling size appear to have a positive influence on valuations. As a robustness check, Annex 8 presents similar estimates using as the dependent variable the estimated WTP under model 3, which rules out the possibility of obtaining negative WTP.
Effects of Electricity Attributes on Choosing Service Improvements
This section examines the predicted probabilities to identify the preferred composition of attribute levels. I identify services profiles corresponding to the 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th
percentiles. For informal users, who tend to have three daily blackouts, the least preferred profile, with the lowest probability of being selected at the 1st percentile, is that of one blackout per week for 12 hours, with very unstable current voltage, delays in response to complaints, some delays in bill delivery, and a (high) monthly cost of US$46. The profile at the 50th percentile, with 20 percent chance of selection, also dominates in all attributes to the previous one except for punctuality in bill delivery. The profile at the 75th percentile dominates the 1st percentile in all attributes, and, while this was not intended in the experimental design, it shows the rationality of the respondents. In contrast, the profile at the 99th percentile suggests that users are quite disposed to trade lower prices for an additional interruption per month and lower quality of commercial attributes.
That users are more inclined toward trade-offs in the levels of commercial attributes than in reliability can also be observed in the case of formal users. Between the 75th and 99th percentiles, these respondents give up delays in response time to claims and bill delivery for fewer interruptions and greater current stability.
Although the distribution of the predicted probabilities looks similar between types of users, recall that most of the informal users choose not to stay in the status quo, while around 15 percent of the formal respondents choose to stay, which would be explained because they already have a reliable quality of service.
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Conclusions and Potential Policy Implications
Low-quality electricity services, informal access, and highly subsidized electricity supply are interrelated and persistent problems in developing countries. This situation implies significant costs for the utilities, government, and poorer segments of the population, who generally are the most affected and have the lowest means to cope with service deficiencies. Understanding the demand-side view of the trade-off between low quality and cheap or free service represents a basic input to the design of effective policies aimed to escape this low-quality infrastructure trap. With the goal of contributing toward that end, this paper exploits a stated preferences experiment to study individuals' valuations for improved electricity supply in the Dominican
Republic, a country with one of the highest rates of electricity theft and lowest quality of services.
The results strongly suggest that poor households are willing to pay for improved The estimates are nonetheless highly heterogeneous. In addition to the type of end-user (formal, informal), income plays a significant role in shaping users' preferences and valuations. Although the first-degree income effect seems to smooth the negative shock associated with low-quality services, the second-degree effect increases aversion to poor services. All in all, the cross-sectional estimates of the average income elasticity of WTP are around 0.1, indicating that households are willing to pay for improvements according to their economic conditions. Another variable that is positively and strongly associated with estimated WTP is users' satisfaction, which has a main effect of around 18 percent, sending the message that users reward good quality of services.
Potential policy implications. WTP for improved services is a key parameter for public policy, as well as, for private utilities, which is frequently used to evaluate the cost 22 effectiveness of projects and the optimal mix of attribute levels. The estimates in this paper are thus potentially of interest in several Latin American countries facing high rates of electricity theft and low-quality electricity services. The estimates may be directly applicable to evaluating potential infrastructure projects in the context under analysis. For example, a direct policy question is how much would be the aggregate gains of increasing quality and charging for it. To provide a hint to this question, I expand the estimated WTP to the population of customers corresponding to an equivalent quality of service. This calculation corrects for the proportion that have negative WTP, assuming that they would not pay additional amounts. Table 8 Policy design needs to take into account heterogeneity. This study shows that informal end-users tend to be poorer and have consistently lower WTP. Therefore, the question remains whether such an average amount would be enough to cover the costs of providing improved service, and at the same time satisfy users' energy needs. At the current electricity tariffs, the amount that informal users would pay represents 80 kWh/month, which is around where the greater density of consumption concentrates. This quantity seems reasonable according to the literature. However, the lowest income group would be greatly vulnerable to price shocks, suggesting that subsidies may still be required to ensure affordability and reduce energy poverty. Note: Total of 2,496 observation, 513 informal users, and 1,930 formal users. There are 13 nonresponses for electricity expenditures, and 24 nonresponses for household income. Diff. = mean differences between formal and informal users. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p<0.001. Note: (1) = multinomial logit; (2) = random parameter logit (RPL); (3) and (4) = RPL and RPL with heterogeneity in parameter means depending on income, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. Total observations = 1,572. Total respondents = 524. Based on 500 replications using Halton draws sequences. Note: (1) = multinomial logit; (2) = random parameter logit (RPL); (3) and (4) = RPL and RPL with heterogeneity in parameter means depending on income, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. Total observations = 5,916. Total respondents = 1,972. Based on 500 replications using Halton draws sequences. Note: Estimated probability for attributes' levels combination corresponding to the 1st, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 99th percentiles of the predicted probability distribution under model 5. 
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Note: (1) = multinomial logit; (2) = random parameter logit (RPL); (3) and (4) = RPL and RPL with heterogeneity in parameter means depending on income, respectively. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. Total observations = 5,916. Total respondents = 1,972. Based on 500 replications using Halton draws sequences. Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
